Bounded Rationality and Retrospection

In Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press UK (1990)
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Abstract

Argues that many of the weaknesses of game theory arise from weaknesses in how economists model individual behaviour: with hyper‐rational and forward‐looking, farsighted individuals. Progress is likely to be made by re‐examining our models of behaviour, incorporating bounds to individual rationality and modelling individuals who are more retrospective, learning adaptively from the past.

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