Is color experience linguistically penetrable?

Synthese 199 (1-2):4261-4285 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I address the question of whether differences in color terminology cause differences in color experience in speakers of different languages. If linguistic representations directly affect color experience, then this is a case of what I call the linguistic penetrability of perception, which is a particular case of cognitive penetrability. I start with some general considerations about cognitive penetration and its alleged occurrence in the memory color effect. I then apply similar considerations to the interpretation of empirical studies of color perception in speakers of different languages. I argue that findings such as differences in categorical perception in speakers of different languages do not show that language affects color experience. They therefore do not support the claim that color experience is linguistically penetrable. But even if we grant that color experience is different in speakers of different languages, I argue that this might still not be a case of linguistic penetration. Finally, I consider some epistemological consequences of the assumption that speakers of different languages have different color experiences.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable?Berit Brogaard & Dimitria E. Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):193-214.
“Categorical Perception” and Linguistic Categorization of Color.Radek Ocelák - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):55-70.
Being Red and Seeing Red: Sensory and Perceptible Qualities.Peter W. Ross - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Color Experience: A Semantic Theory.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford. pp. 67--90.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-01-07

Downloads
320 (#84,599)

6 months
160 (#23,026)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Raquel Krempel
Federal University of ABC, Brazil

Citations of this work

Aphantasia and involuntary imagery.Raquel Krempel & Merlin Monzel - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 120 (C):103679.

Add more citations