Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems

Hegel Bulletin 40 (1):1-28 (2019)
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Abstract

Hegel’sLogicargues in a manner that is supposed to support a systematic philosophy. But it is difficult to explain how such a systematic argument is supposed to work. For answers, I look to the key transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept. Here we find discussions of both Spinozist and Kantian systems of philosophy: both are supposed to be helpful, and yet also to be lacking in instructive ways. So the initial hope is that these comparisons can help us to understand Hegel’s own systematic argument, and what it means to transition from an objective to a ‘Subjective Logic’. But the comparisons bring additional difficulties. First, to defend a comprehensive system involves refuting rivals, and the discussion of Spinoza demonstrates that refutation is difficult. Second, it is hard to see how any argument for Hegel’s system could be akin to those in Spinoza and Kant given the extent of the differences between them. I argue that the best way to deal with these difficulties is to explain the systematic argument of theLogicas modelled on the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant’s firstCritique.

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Author's Profile

James Kreines
Claremont McKenna College

References found in this work

The Linguistic Turn.Richard Rorty - 1969 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 2 (3):179-181.
Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.Robert B. Pippin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):449 - 475.
Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.James Kreines - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):466–480.
Kant's first paralogism.Ian Proops - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):449–495.
What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?Markus Gabriel - 2016 - Hegel Bulletin 37 (2):181-208.

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