Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits

In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan (2010)
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Abstract

According to interpretivism, all there is to having an intentional property is being best interpreted as having it. I present a regress-or-circularity argument against this. In §1, I elucidate interpretivism, and in §2, I present the argument against it.

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Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge.T. Parent - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):709-725.

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