Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl: On Two Types of Transcendental Idealism

Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 8 (2):280-303 (2016)
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Abstract

The idea that subjectivity makes up the foundation or source of all objectivity applies to all transcendental idealists. Nevertheless, Husserl conceives of this relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in a radically different fashion than Kant. Husserl’s conception leads to a primacy of the noetic dimension of sense at the expense of the noematic dimension. In order to render this explicit, not only a closer look at Kant’s transcendental deduction is illuminating but also taking into account neo-Kantianism. In contrast to Husserl, Kant and the neo-Kantians grant primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema.

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