Abstract

Most of the theories of reference in this century can be seen as participating in one unified approach which I call the conceptual/descriptive program of reference. Recently, howver, this program has been challenged, and a new approach is emerging. I demonstrate how the referential/attributive distinction plays a crucial role in the rejection of the traditional program. Thus in order to evaluate whether the repudiation of the old program is justified we must begin by examining the referential/attributive distinction itself. ;As a first step I argue that the referential/attributive distinction is generally defined by two criteria which are supposed to be coextensive, but in fact are not. After presenting these criteria I show their independence and discuss them separately. The first criterion has to do with the ability to refer when using the "wrong" description. It is alleged that the conceptual/descriptive approach cannot explain how such an ability is possible. I argue, however, that an analysis of the speaker's intentions in referring to an object qua being the so-and-so, eliminates the difficulty. The second criterion differentiates between "having a particular object in mind" and "referring to whatever is the so-and-so". First, I consider what interpretations are available for those who use the second criterion to criticize the conceptual/descriptive program. Then I argue that the only plausible interpretation is the one which utilizes the concept of a referential chain. However, I argue that no chain theory of de-re thought can be an alternative to the conceptual/descriptive program. ;Next I consider two arguments which are motivated by the second criterion, and which are used against the conceptual/descriptive theory of de-re thought. The first argument is intended to show that not all de-re thoughts are de-dicto. The second is intended to show that not all de-dicto thoughts are de-re. These arguments raise various problems for the traditional view, but I show that these problems can be resolved in a rather simple manner. ;Finally, I argue that although the conceptual/descriptive program of reference has to be modified, we are by no means compelled to reject it