Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (2023)
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Abstract

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true.

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Vladimir Krstic
United Arab Emirates University

Citations of this work

A Functional Analysis of Human Deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (4):836-854.
Absorbed in Deceit: Modeling Intention-Driven Self-Deception with Agential Layering.Kevin Korczyk - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.

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