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Contrastivism and closure
Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256 (2008)
Abstract
This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developedAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Causal Overdetermination and Kim’s Exclusion Argument.Michael Roche - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):809-826.
Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.
Problems for contrastive closure: resolved and regained.Michael Hughes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.
Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.
References found in this work
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Good knowledge, bad knowledge: on two dogmas of epistemology.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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