Identity in Homotopy Type Theory: Part II, The Conceptual and Philosophical Status of Identity in HoTT

Philosophia Mathematica 25 (2):210-245 (2017)
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Abstract

Among the most interesting features of Homotopy Type Theory is the way it treats identity, which has various unusual characteristics. We examine the formal features of “identity types” in HoTT, and how they relate to its other features including intensionality, constructive logic, the interpretation of types as concepts, and the Univalence Axiom. The unusual behaviour of identity types might suggest that they be reinterpreted as representing indiscernibility. We explore this by defining indiscernibility in HoTT and examine its relationship with identity. We argue that identity types are a primitive component of HoTT and cannot be reduced to indiscernibility.

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original Ladyman, James; Presnell, Stuart (2016) "Identity in Homotopy Type Theory: Part II, The Conceptual and Philosophical Status of Identity in HoTT". Philosophia Mathematica ():nkw023

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Citations of this work

The Hole Argument in Homotopy Type Theory.James Ladyman & Stuart Presnell - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (4):319-329.
Universes and univalence in homotopy type theory.James Ladyman & Stuart Presnell - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):426-455.
On gauge symmetries, indiscernibilities, and groupoid-theoretical equalities.Gabriel Catren - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C):244-261.

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References found in this work

Mathematics as a science of patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - New York ;: Oxford University Press.
Identity.Peter T. Geach - 1967 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (1):3 - 12.
Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology.Hannes Leitgib & James Ladyman - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):388-396.

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