Abstract

Supererogatory acts are usually characterized as acts that fit the following criteria: (1) they are beyond duty and (2) they are morally good. The combination of these two elements — optionality and praiseworthiness — has the effect of singling out a category of acts amenable to moral assessment which find no ready place in Kant's theory of moral worth and obligation. In formulating the necessary conditions of moral worth, Kant gives duty a scope so broad that it leaves no room for supererogatory actions. Against T. Hill, who gives a clear and sophisticated case for the idea that supererogatory acts can be captured within Kant's notion of wide imperfect duty, it is argued that no reductionist account succeeds in sending the criticism home. First of all, Hill's suggestion wouldn't satisfy unqualified supererogationists. Moreover, it is shown that his proposal isn't one that Kant himself would welcome. This conclusion is illustrated through some texts from the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, where Kant's intuitive distrust of "supermeritorious" acts finds a most clear expression in the context of moral education. Although Kant's critical remarks on moral actions over and above duty are often not without truth, it is argued that they nevertheless don't suffice to discredit the idea of supererogation in itself