Making Sense of Shame

Philosophy 97 (2):233-255 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that we face a challenge in understanding the relationship between the ‘value-oriented’ and ‘other-oriented’ dimensions of shame. On the one hand, an emphasis on shame's value-oriented dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, an account which faces a challenge in explaining shame's other-oriented dimension. This is liable to push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’. However The Social Evaluation View faces the opposite challenge of convincingly accommodating shame's ‘value-oriented’ dimension. After rejecting one attempt to chart a middle course between these extremes, I argue that progress can be made if we reject the widespread assumption that the other-oriented dimension of shame is best understood primarily terms of our concern with the way we appear to others. Instead, I outline an account which treats shame as manifesting our desire primarily for interpersonal connection and which elucidates the property of shamefulness in terms of merited avoidance.

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James Laing
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

The harm of humiliation.James Laing - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):532-547.
Interpersonal connection.James Laing - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (2):162-178.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-50.
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity.Charles Taylor - 2016 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Must we mean what we say?Stanley Cavell - 1969 - New York,: Scribner.

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