Why the Naïve Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematicians’ Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge

Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):401-404 (2016)
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Abstract

The view that a mathematical proof is a sketch of or recipe for a formal derivation requires the proof to function as an argument that there is a suitable derivation. This is a mathematical conclusion, and to avoid a regress we require some other account of how the proof can establish it.

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10.1093/philmat/nkw012

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Brendan Larvor
University of Hertfordshire

Citations of this work

Reliability of mathematical inference.Jeremy Avigad - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7377-7399.
Audience role in mathematical proof development.Zoe Ashton - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 26):6251-6275.

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References found in this work

Proofs and refutations (IV).I. Lakatos - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (56):296-342.
Proofs and Refutations.Imre Lakatos - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):474-478.
Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
Proofs and refutations (II).Imre Lakatos - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (54):120-139.
Mathematics, Form and Function.Saunders MacLane - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):33-37.

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