Abstract

This thesis consists of three papers discussing the nature of intentional mental states and their attribution, focusing on beliefs and thoughts. Chapter one looks at the problem of equivalence in giving a possible worlds semantics for belief reports. Proposed solutions by Paul Pietroski and Robert Stalnaker are examined and found to be unsatisfactory. I suggest that one might identify the denotation of a that-clause with an interpreted logical form, while holding a possible worlds theory of belief. ;Chapter two discusses Martin Davies's a priori argument that thinking involves a language of thought. I point out that Davies's argument rests on an equivocation and is therefore invalid. Davies's argument appeals to considerations based on the possession of concepts. I explain why such considerations do not provide any a priori reason for accepting his conclusion. ;In response to externalism, it has been argued that beliefs and thoughts have "narrow contents" that are determined by the intrinsic properties of their subjects. In chapter three I distinguish between three different explanatory tasks that narrow content is supposed to perform. I argue that none of the three motivations justify the thesis that all beliefs and thoughts have narrow content.