Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire

In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the “guise of the good”), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the “death of desire” principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward system is the key to understanding desire. The second part of the introduction summarizes the contributions to this volume. The hope is to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on this neglected, albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 352.
The Guise of the Ought-to-Be. A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Defending the motivational theory of desire.David Pineda Oliva - forthcoming - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science.
Desire and Aversion.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - In Three Faces of Desire. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
The Impossibility of Conscious Desire.Donovan Hulse, Cynthia Read & Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):73 - 80.
Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-05-10

Downloads
870 (#25,169)

6 months
95 (#61,320)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Federico Lauria
University of Lisbon
Julien Deonna
University of Geneva

Citations of this work

How Beliefs are like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251.
The Proper Objects of Faith and Hope.Michael Scott - 2023 - The Monist 106 (1):25-34.
Defending the motivational theory of desire.David Pineda Oliva - forthcoming - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 51 references / Add more references