Why we do not have to treat like cases alike

Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4):313-318 (1988)
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Abstract

Offers reasons for rejecting principle of relevant similarity. Like cases need not be treated alike. I may treat one person better than another simply because I prefer to do so.

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Michael Lavin
Stanford University (PhD)

Citations of this work

The roots of relevant similarity.Margaret Ayotte Levvis - 1992 - Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2):289-291.

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