Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to refute evidentialism and to replace it with an alternate theory. In chapter 1 I explain how evidentialism has been used to support religious agnosticism, and I also offer and defend a counterexample to evidentialism. The key idea behind the counterexample is that, if we must always suspend judgment on weakly supported propositions , we will sometimes fail to trust others as we ought. ;In chapter 2 I turn to William James's essay, "The Will to Believe" for inspiration in developing an alternative to evidentialism. In chapter 3 I argue that James's theory is open to several sorts of counterexample. The crucial idea here is that a belief can be prudent without being rational in any epistemic sense. ;In chapter 4 I examine a standard objection to the will-to-believe doctrine--that believing is not something over which we have voluntary control. I conclude that we do have voluntary control over some beliefs. In chapter 5 I complete my development of an alternative to evidentialism by trying to say what sorts of things one must be able to gain via believing-more-than-the-evidence-warrants in order to be justified in so believing. And in chapter 6 I apply my modified will-to-believe doctrine to the case of believing that God exists, concluding that belief in God is rational