Abstract

I reflect herein on the diverse commentaries for my feature article, ‘Towards an ethics of pronatalism in South Korea (and beyond),’1 taking up each commentary in turn. Shandilya and Murphy claim that the state is “entitled to take measures to ensure economic and demographic sustainability,”2 contrary to my characterisation of state viewpoint neutrality. Pronatalist policies are, after all, one of many tools that the state might deploy to protect long-term economic and social stability. I don’t object to the view that the state may be entitled, in general, to take certain kinds of action on behalf of their citizens. However, childbirth is a special case in which the risks that would have to be imposed on a certain group (the childcarers and would-be gestators) to achieve this ‘greater good’ are rather high, especially if there are not so many citizens who are individually willing (or able) to undergo this process for the sake of that greater good. Promoting childbirth in a populace that is already hesitant about procreation (for whatever reason) would have negative implications for the negative rights of those citizens (to not be harmed). We have already witnessed the moral costs of such negative rights violations in the case of anti-natalist policies undertaken against a population (or certain groups of people) who do want children. Hence, I would maintain that efforts to address population dynamics, as a matter of imperfect duty, should rather focus on wider solutions that would improve the lives of everyone, rather than on fertility rates per se. Räsänen and Smajdor challenge my assumption that coercive pronatalism must obviously …