Revising Carroll’s Mirror Argument

Axiomathes 32 (6):1013-1024 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I examine J. Carroll's “Mirror Argument” against the Humean conception of law and H. Beebee's response to this argument. I will first show that Beebee's criticism is quite plausible if it is refined slightly. Then, I will propose a revised version of the Mirror Argument which is immune to criticisms like that of Beebee's. According to the Humean conception of law, I will argue, we should accept the existence of counterfactual dependence relation where there should not be such relation.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

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