Alternative paradigmatic hypotheses cannot be fairly evaluated from within one's own paradigmatic assumptions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):430-439 (2003)
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Abstract

To avoid endless and futile debate, critics of an alternative paradigmatic hypothesis cannot simply state their own paradigmatic assumptions as if they were plain fact while dismissing those of the opposition as self-evidently absurd, because it is exactly those initial assumptions that are brought into question by the paradigmatic proposal. Perceived incredibility is no valid ground for rejection of a paradigm whose alternatives are at least equally incredible, and arguably more so.

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