Abstract

In his critique of post-Kantian philosophy, Meillassoux expresses considerable doubts as to how it is capable of describing a world independent of man. He places Heidegger among the ranks of thinkers who are caught in the same trap of the thought-world circle. In this article, I will first examine which complex indirect proof Meillassoux uses to find a path towards an independent reality. In the next step, I will discuss where Heidegger locates Beings in themselves against the backdrop of the Dasein-Being correlation. A radical change of perspective on what it means to be a thinking and understanding “subject” is proposed in this context. In contrast to Meillassoux, an appropriate interpretation of Heidegger’s Dasein can show that there is no need for an indirect proof of a real outside of the correlation. The decisive question is how Heidegger’s correlation of Dasein and Being can be reconciled with statements about the ancestral or whether it stands in implacable opposition to such statements.