The Friedman—Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic

Journal of Symbolic Logic 77 (3):777-806 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth

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Citations of this work

Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A proof-theoretic account of classical principles of truth.Graham E. Leigh - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (10):1009-1024.
Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.

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References found in this work

Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16:83-94.
An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.

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