The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction

Noûs 48 (4):781-793 (2013)
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Abstract

We argue that giving up on the closure of rational belief under conjunction comes with a substantial price. Either rational belief is closed under conjunction, or else the epistemology of belief has a serious diachronic deficit over and above the synchronic failures of conjunctive closure. The argument for this, which can be viewed as a sequel to the preface paradox, is called the ‘review paradox'; it is presented in four distinct, but closely related versions

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
Vagueness in Context.Stewart Shapiro - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.

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