Vindicating the verifiability criterion

Philosophical Studies 181 (1):223-245 (2024)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue for a revised and precisified version of the infamous Verifiability Criterion for the meaningfulness of declarative sentences. The argument is based on independently plausible premises concerning probabilistic confirmation and meaning as context-change potential, it is shown to be logically valid, and its ramifications for potential applications of the criterion are being discussed. Although the paper is not historical but systematic, the criterion thus vindicated will resemble the original one(s) in some important ways. At the same time, it will also be more modest insofar as meaningfulness will turn out to be relativized linguistically and probabilistically, and different choices of the linguistic and probabilistic parameters may lead to different verdicts on meaningfulness.

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

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