Peut-on déconstruire la tradition empiriste? : À propos de la critique bradleyenne de la psychologie associationniste

Laval Théologique et Philosophique 74 (1):53-77 (2018)
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Abstract

Guillaume Lejeune | : La philosophie de Bradley se présente moins comme une tentative d’importation de la pensée allemande en Angleterre que comme une volonté de régler par le recours à divers écoles les problèmes dans lesquels la tradition empiriste se dépêtre : un atomisme de la connaissance et une conception externaliste des relations qui rendraient impossible une vision unitaire de l’expérience. La critique que développe Bradley de l’association d’idées dans la mesure où elle fait ressortir les présuppositions de la tradition empiriste et en rejette le bien-fondé peut se lire comme une tentative de déconstruction de celle-ci. | : Bradley’s philosophy is not a mere attempt to import German thought in Great-Britain, but a willingness to regulate the problems in which the empiricist tradition is entangled — an atomism of knowledge and an externalist conception of relation that make impossible a unitary view of experience — by borrowing ideas from various schools. According to Bradley, associationism clearly brings out the two problematic aspects of the whole empiricism. That is why his rejection has a strategic character. It can be read as an attempt to “deconstruct” the empiricist tradition.

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