A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions

Dialectica 66 (1):45-67 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,792

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Desire and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.
Taking on intentions.Chrisoula Andreou - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):157-169.
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.
Ludwig on Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):61-74.
Hoping and Intending.Cathy Mason - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):514-529.
From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions.Adam J. Andreotta - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4):1375-1397.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-01-11

Downloads
99 (#223,980)

6 months
3 (#1,155,553)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stéphane Lemaire
University of Rennes 1

Citations of this work

Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism.Raamy Majeed - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):75-96.
How to tell essence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):147-168.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Emotions.Nico Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references