A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions

Dialectica 66 (1):45-67 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Desire and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.
Taking on intentions.Chrisoula Andreou - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):157-169.
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.
Ludwig on Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):61-74.
Hoping and Intending.Cathy Mason - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):514-529.
From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
Desires.Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):267-302.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-01-11

Downloads
99 (#219,844)

6 months
3 (#1,061,821)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stéphane Lemaire
University of Rennes 1

Citations of this work

Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism.Raamy Majeed - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):75-96.
How to tell essence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):147-168.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Emotions.Nico Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references