Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge

Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194 (2009)
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Abstract

Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.

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Noah Lemos
William & Mary

References found in this work

Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1995 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905-906.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):782-787.

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