The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2):37-50 (2005)
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Abstract

Let me say something, to begin with, about wanting weird stuff. Stuff like saucers of mud. The example, famously, is from Anscombe’s Intention (Anscombe Anscombe 957)) where she is, in effect, defending a version of the old scholastic maxim, Omne appetitum appetitur sub specie boni. If your Latin is rusty like mine, what that says is just that every appetite – for better congruence with modern discussions, let’s say every desire – desires under the aspect of the good, or in the wording made current by Velleman, under the guise of the good (Velleman 992). To desire something is to regard it as good in some way, as having some desirability characteristic. And not just any old thing can be regarded as good in some way, as having some desirability characteristic. Obviously if this is correct, it rules against our giving desires any sort of ground-floor role in our understand-.

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James Lenman
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Guise of the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
Normativity, agency, and life.James Barham - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):92-103.
Why Hegel Now – and in What Form?Robert Stern - 2016 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78:187-210.
Hegel, Norms and Ontology.Joe Saunders - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (3):279-297.

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References found in this work

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
The representation of life.Michael Thompson - 1995 - In Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence & Warren Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 247--296.
Natures and norms.Louise M. Antony - 2000 - Ethics 111 (1):8-36.
Does moral subjectivism rest on a mistake?Philippa Foot - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:107-.

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