Identity and the composite Christ: An incarnational dilemma

Religious Studies 45 (2):167-186 (2009)
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Abstract

One way of understanding the reduplicative formula "Christ is, ’qua’ God, omniscient, but ’qua’ man, limited in knowledge" is to take the occurrences of the ‘qua‘ locution as picking out different parts of Christ: a divine part and a human part. But this view of Christ as a composite being runs into paradox when combined with the orthodox understanding of the Incarnation, according to which Christ is identical to the second person of the Trinity. In response, we have to choose between modifying the orthodox understanding, adopting a philosophically and theologically contentious perdurantist account of persistence through time, or rejecting altogether the idea of the composite Christ

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2009-04-23

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Robin Le Poidevin
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Recent developments in analytic Christology.James M. Arcadi - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (4):e12480.
Thomistic Multiple Incarnations.Timothy Pawl - 2014 - Heythrop Journal (6):359-370.
Relativizing Identity.Daniel Molto - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):260-269.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Th Sider - 2001 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Parthood and identity across time.Judith Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.

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