Abstract

Moore characterizes metaphysics as “the most general attempt to make sense of things.” This is not offered as a piece of conceptual analysis, which we might challenge by putative counterexample, but rather as an inclusive organizing principle. Nevertheless, there are ways in which (I submit) the definition could be helpfully developed, to draw out distinctive (and distinctively valuable) aspects of philosophical, and more specifically metaphysical, inquiry, and I offer some suggestions here. The aspects addressed include the appearance of mind-independence in the subject matter of metaphysics, and the importance of critical inquiry. Two concerns are raised about Moore’s inclusion of non-propositional sense-making in his conception of metaphysics: how the notion of generality applies to non-propositional sense-making; and what success-condition in non-propositional sense-making would be the counterpart of truth in propositional sense-making. I end by considering whether, despite the inclusiveness of his characterization, Moore’s view of the real point of doing metaphysics involves commitment to realism about the self.