Random Selection, Democracy and Citizen Expertise

Res Publica 30 (1):145-157 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper looks at Alexander Guerrero’s epistemic case for ‘lottocracy’, or government by randomly selected citizen assemblies. It argues that Guerrero fails to show that citizen expertise is more likely to be elicited and brought to bear on democratic politics if we replace elections with random selection. However, randomly selected citizen assemblies can be valuable deliberative and participative additions to elected and appointed institutions even when citizens are not bearers of special knowledge or virtue individually or collectively.

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2023-04-04

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Annabelle Lever
Sciences Po, Paris

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