A note on the doomsday argument

Analysis 70 (1):27-30 (2010)
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Abstract

I argue that the Doomsday argument fails because it fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle.

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2009-07-15

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Peter J. Lewis
Dartmouth College

Citations of this work

Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
Self-location and Causal Context.Simon Friederich - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):232-258.

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References found in this work

Sleeping beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
Past longevity as evidence for the future.Ronald Pisaturo - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):73-100.

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