Aristotle’s Nous as Telos-related Teasoning: an Explanation

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (2):195-200 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is important to re-investigate Aristotle’s concept of nous. This concept basically denotes some telos-related thinking/reasoning activity of the human intellect, which proceeds both upward and downward: upward to grasp a comprehension of the telos one has acquired, and downward to reach some ultimate end. It differs from the theoretical thinking/reasoning of science in its upward-proceeding inquiries in that it constitutes a comprehension of the very first principles; it differs from technique in its downward-proceeding reasoning in that it always proceeds with a certain comprehension of or insight into the telos of human beings. As it aims to attain some ultimate end, in practical affairs it is construed to proceed with downward reasoning. This downward reasoning zigzags around the issues being faced, until reaching some ultimate point, at which we need no more thinking and simply act. To see how this helps us in finding a way to the good life, we must adopt a special perspective on living, i.e., that of the good man, because it contains and is addressed to greater truth.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Toward a Basic Mutual Understanding between Confucian and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.Shen-bai Liao - 2017 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 36 (3):273-284.
Correlative Reasoning about Water in Mengzi 6A2.Nicholaos Jones - 2016 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15 (2):193-207.
Teleonomy as a problem of self-causation.Nathalie Gontier - forthcoming - Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 139:388–414.
Virtue, Nature and Practice.Jing Liu - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (2):201-205.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-08

Downloads
3 (#1,850,836)

6 months
3 (#1,470,638)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

S. Matthew Liao
New York University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references