A Promise Acceptance Model of Organ Donation

Social Theory and Practice 41 (1):131-148 (2015)
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Abstract

I aim to understand how the act of becoming an organ donor impacts whether it is permissible for a family veto to override an individual’s wish to donate. I argue that a Consent Model does not capture the right understanding of donor autonomy. I then assess a Gift Model and a Promise Model, arguing that both fail to capture important data about the ability to revoke one’s donor status. I then propose a Promise Acceptance Model, which construes becoming an organ donor as accepting a promise the state makes to you to use your organs. This model, which implies that family vetoes are impermissible, captures the data other models struggle to accommodate.

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2015-09-04

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Alida Liberman
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead.James Stacey Taylor - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (6):547-559.

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References found in this work

The Misfortunes of the Dead.George Pitcher - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):183-188.
It is immoral to require consent for cadaver organ donation.H. E. Emson - 2003 - Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (3):125-127.

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