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Time Factors in Conscious Processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes
Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12 (2000)
Abstract
The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticizedOther Versions
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The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications.Benjamin Libet - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
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Citations of this work
Physical, neural, and mental timing.Wim van de Grind - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.
Problems in the timing of conscious experience.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications.Benjamin Libet - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
When timing the mind should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions.Steve Joordens, Marc van Duijn & Thomas M. Spalek - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.
Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet’s findings.Benjamin Libet - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
References found in this work
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl - 1983 - Brain 106 (3):623--664.
Brain stimulation in the study of neuronal functions for conscious sensory experiences.Benjamin W. Libet - 1982 - Human Neurobiology 1:235-42.
The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P. S. Churchland.Benjamin Libet - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.
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