The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism

Logos and Episteme 4 (1):21-29 (2013)
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Abstract

Surely, it is possible that you believe falsely about this-or-that modal matter. In light of the various ways the world could be arranged, it is plausible thatthere is a nearby possible world, which would be almost identical to the actual world, if it were actualized, where you and your modal counterpart disagree over modal belief p. You might be tempted to think that your modal belief is true, while hers is not. It is not clear why this is so; after all, you would each have the same evidence, cognitive abilities etc., if you were both actualized. This point generalizes to all of your modal beliefs, this seems to strongly imply that the probability that you have true modal beliefs appears inscrutable. Thus, you have some reason to withhold belief, on modal matters.

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