Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

&
Psychological Review 124 (6):762-794 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1037/rev0000075

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,793

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Resource-rationality as a normative standard of human rationality.Matteo Colombo - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.
Cognitive niches: An ecological model of strategy selection.Julian N. Marewski & Lael J. Schooler - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (3):393-437.
Rational explanation of the selection task.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):381-391.
Chunking as a rational strategy for lossy data compression in visual working memory.Matthew R. Nassar, Julie C. Helmers & Michael J. Frank - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (4):486-511.
Ecologically rational strategy selection.Julian Nicolas Marewski - unknown
Hidden processes in structural representations: A reply to Abbott, Austerweil, and Griffiths (2015).Michael N. Jones, Thomas T. Hills & Peter M. Todd - 2015 - Psychological Review 122 (3):570-574.
Review of 'What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories', by Paul E. Griffiths. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (3):318-324.
Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories:What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.John M. Doris - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):617-619.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-08

Downloads
37 (#588,448)

6 months
8 (#528,772)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tom Griffiths
Aarhus University

Citations of this work

Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.
Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.
Norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
Engineered Wisdom for Learning Machines.Brett Karlan & Colin Allen - 2024 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 36 (2):257-272.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references