Abstract

The dissertation contrasts Kant's epistemological assertiveness with his ontological skepticism as a central issue in the development of the discourse in German Idealism. Fichte's phenomenological demarche essentially amplifies this problem but, at the same time, allows him to advance a path breaking critique of formal logic and to stress the importance of contradiction. Schelling, by restoring metaphysics, attempts to overcome Fichte's contrast between ontological dualism and epistemological monism. Finally, it is Hegel who directly addresses the need for a non-formal cognitive logic. The author analyzes Hegel's deduction in the Phenomenology, invokes current genetic epistemology, and reads the Science of Logic as a genetic theory of systematic knowledge and as circular epistemology. Emphasizing the unity between the logical and the historical, the distinction between intellectual and rational explanation, and the cognitive importance of contradiction, the dissertation argues for the possibility a coming-to-be totality of reflective scientific reason