Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27 (2012)
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Abstract

A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L is an example of a Liar sentence. Several philosophers have proposed that the Liar paradox, and related paradoxes, can be solved by accepting the contradictions that these paradoxes seem to imply (including Priest 2006, Rescher and Brandom 1980). The theory that there are true ..

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Greg Littmann
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

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References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Paraconsistent logic.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
True Contradictions.Terence Parsons - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.

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