On Knowing the ”Why': Particularism and Moral Theory

Hastings Center Report 31 (4):32--40 (2001)
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Abstract

If particularism is right, the broad moral claims we make are usually riddled with exceptions. But such generalizations can still be a useful, even necessary part of moral life. They help us show what we should do, and they are essential for understanding why we should do it.

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Margaret Little
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
Wisdom: A Skill Theory.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.

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