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Three Concepts of Free Action
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49 (1):95-126 (1975)
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Citations of this work
What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.
Blame mitigation: A less tidy take and its philosophical implications.Jennifer L. Daigle & Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (4):490-521.
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