Abstract

The dissertation is a study the correspondence between G. W. Leibniz and Burcher de Voider that took place between 1698 and 1706. De Voider came to Leibniz as a Cartesian, but one who was disenchanted with the view due to its inability to provide a natural explanation of bodily change. I examine Leibniz's attempts to: disabuse De Voider of his lingering Cartesianism---in particular, his view that the material world is a substance constituted by extension alone; and convince De Voider of the alternative metaphysic of body that he favors. The first part of the dissertation is concerned with the negative aspect of this project. A number of different arguments against the Cartesian view of material reality are discussed, along with a consideration of methodological differences that separate the two philosophers. In the second part of the dissertation, the views of Leibniz are explained. Here an account of material reality and bodily change emerges which is grounded in his categories of simple and corporeal substance, with the category of corporeal substance accorded a more prominent status than has been found in many recent studies