Locke's moral man

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's metaphysics of moral agency, in which to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.

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Citations of this work

Locke on the Ontology of Persons.Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):97-123.
Locke on Relations, Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - forthcoming - In Patrick J. Connolly (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of John Locke. Oxford University Press.
‘Archetypes without Patterns’: Locke on Relations and Mixed Modes.Walter Ott - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (3):300-325.
Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?Leonardo Moauro & Samuel C. Rickless - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):9.

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