Abstract

This dissertation examines the moral and political implications of philosophical scepticism. I begin with an introductory treatment of variants of scepticism in contemporary political theory, examining the writings of Richard Rorty, Leo Strauss and Judith Shklar. These three thinkers raise opposing views about doubt's implications: scepticism is allied with liberalism because doubt leads to toleration, and conversely, scepticism is dangerous and leads the way to illiberalism because it undermines the principles which are necessary to support and defend a liberal regime. ;The body of my dissertation is a historical study which seeks to assess this contemporary debate and understand how scepticism, a seemingly negative position, might generate positive prescriptive moral and political conclusions. I study the scepticism of the ancient Greek Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, Hobbes, Diderot and Nietzsche. ;As a result of this historical inquiry, I conclude that controversy over the implications of doubt stems from two main factors. First, scepticism itself is an unstable position, which easily decays into relativism or nihilism. Thus, doubt is mistakenly confounded with these two latter positions, which are dogmatic stances at odds with scepticism. Second, I find that a thorough scepticism is not a sustainable position, that every sceptic is never completely sceptical, that expressions of doubt are always accompanied by non-sceptical beliefs which are often not acknowledged or admitted. Similarly, I find that scepticism is not employed neutrally, rather doubt always seems engaged to further other non-sceptical moral positions. Thus, to understand the implications of doubt, I contend one must be attentive to the moral intentions behind a particular thinker's scepticism. ;In the Conclusion, I argue that it is equally important to look at scepticism not as a position or doctrine, but rather as a temper of mind, or psychological predisposition, to understand how scepticism, though it is a negative stance always defining itself in opposition to others, may be productive of certain kinds of character. Here I find that scepticism is almost universally associated with moderation, and while it may also be productive of indifference, this moderation seems to lead to psychological affinities to liberalism.