Abstract

Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one’s ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time—relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology.