Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil

Philosophia Christi 21 (2):355-369 (2019)
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Abstract

Ebrahim Azadegan recently argues that personal anti-theism, the view that it’s rational for a particular individual to prefer that God not exist, is a form of gratuitous evil. He justifies this evil by arguing that the anti-theist is uniquely positioned to bargain, implore, and plea to God. I argue that Azadegan faces a paradox. Once the anti-theist recognizes that God plus anti-theism makes the world better, she should convert to pro-theism. But then there can be no reflective anti-theists who could add value to the world. Ignorance is a requirement of the anti-theist who can offer these unique goods.

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Kirk Lougheed
University of Pretoria

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