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Truth and provability
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):331-2 (2007)
Abstract
The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsedAuthor's Profile
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