First-person knowledge and authority

In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt & Alexander Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson’s Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Let us call a thought or belief whose content would be expressed by a sentence of subject-predicate form (by the thinker or someone attributing the thought to the thinker) an ‘ascription’. Thus, the thought that Madonna is middle-aged is an ascription of the property of being middle-aged to Madonna. To call a thought of this form an ascription is to emphasize the predicate in the sentence that gives its content. Let us call an ‘x-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is x, that is, an ascription such that the subject of the sentence which would express its content is x. Let us call a ‘self-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is identical with the ascriber. Let us call a ‘reflexive ascription’ a selfascription such that either (i) in the sentence the ascriber would use to attribute correctly the ascription to himself he would use the first person pronoun to refer to himself both as the ascriber and as the subject of the ascription, as in a sentence of the form, I believe that I ö

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
On the ascription of content.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 153-206.
Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se.Richard Holton - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 399–410.
On Belief Content and That-Clauses.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):274-298.
Self‐Knowledge and Intentional Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - In Being known. New York: Oxford University Press.
A memorable thirteen-word sentence.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Semiotica 2015 (204):95-99.
Introspection, déploiement et simulation.Jérôme Dokic - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (2):383-397.
Self-ascription: Thought insertion.George Graham - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 89.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
311 (#89,450)

6 months
121 (#45,628)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Brains in a vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.

Add more references