Against Divine Amorism

Journal of Analytic Theology 12:17-28 (2024)
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Abstract

Why did the triune God summon creation into being? What did God aim at in the creation of the world? There are two main camps in the Christian tradition in response to this question: divine amorism and divine glorificationism. Recently, Jordan Wessling has forcefully argued for the former. But it seems to me that divine glorificationism follows from doctrinal cornerstones most Christians take to be true. In this paper, I will argue that the metaphysics of creation entailed by the conjunction of divine aseity and divine perfectionism (e.g. the notion that God is the Source and Sum of all Being, Goodness, Beauty, Truth, and Value—all perfections derive from God’s perfections) necessarily entail divine glorificationism. This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will outline both divine glorificationism and divine amorism, briefly sketching arguments for both positions with an emphasis on objections to glorificationism. Second, I will sketch the doctrines of divine aseity and divine perfectionism and argue that both doctrines yield a doctrine of divine ideas and a particular metaphysics of creation’s relationship to God. Third, I will argue that this metaphysics necessarily entails a version of divine glorificationism that answers the concern of divine amorists. Finally, I will conclude by responding to potential objections.

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