Interpretations of Probability and Bayesian Inference—an Overview

Acta Analytica 35 (1):129-146 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, I first give a short outline of the different interpretations of the concept of probability that emerged in the twentieth century. In what follows, I give an overview of the main problems and problematic concepts from the philosophy of probability and show how they relate to Bayesian inference. In this overview, I emphasise that the understanding of the main concepts related to different interpretations of probability influences the understanding and status of Bayesian inference. In the conclusion, I express that, from a broad epistemological point of view, a kind of compatibilism between the two main lines of interpretations of probability is worth pursuing, as they represent different aspects of the epistemological process.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,619

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-06-16

Downloads
45 (#483,532)

6 months
10 (#375,783)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Lukan
University of Ljubljana

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.

View all 28 references / Add more references