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To Explain or to Predict: Which One is Mandatory?
Foundations of Science 23 (2):411-414 (2018)
Abstract
Recently, Luk mentioned that scientific knowledge both explains and predicts. Do these two functions of scientific knowledge have equal significance, or is one of the two functions more important than the other? This commentary explains why prediction may be mandatory but explanation may be only desirable and optional.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Why is Information Retrieval a Scientific Discipline?Robert W. P. Luk - 2022 - Foundations of Science 27 (2):427-453.
What Do We Mean by “True” in Scientific Realism?Robert W. P. Luk - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (3):845-856.
References found in this work
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world.Philip Kitcher - 1962 - In Philip Kitcher & Wesley C. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Univ of Minnesota Pr. pp. 410-505.
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Ronald N. Giere - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):444.
Scientific Explanation.P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):85-98.
Statistical explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1970 - In Robert G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 173--231.
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